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Abstract—In contemporary software development there
are a number of methods that attempt to ensure the security
of a system. Many of these methods are however introduced
in the latter stages of development or try to address the
issues of securing a software system by envisioning possible
threats to that system, knowledge that is usually both
subjective and esoteric.
In this paper we introduce the concept of path fixation
and discuss how contradictory paths or loopholes, discov-
ered during requirements engineering and using only a
requirements specification document, can lead to potential
security flaws in a proposed system.
The SECREt is a proof-of-concept prototype tool devel-
oped to demonstrate the effectiveness of loophole analysis.
We discuss how the tool performs a loophole analysis
and present the results of tests conducted on an actual
specification document. We conclude that loophole analysis
is an effective, objective method for the discovery of
potential vulnerabilitites that exist in proposed systems and
that the SECREt can be successfully incorporated into the
requirements engineering process.
Index Terms—Security, Loopholes, Requirements Engi-
neering, SECREt.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cross-cutting concerns are those parts of a system
whose functionality spans multiple system modules. Se-
curity is typically represented as one such cross-cutting
concern. The security of systems and the information
these systems are designed and built to manage is
primary among the issues considered when developing
these systems [1]–[3]. To address the issues related to
the security of systems, many methods and approaches
have been incorporated into software development pro-
cesses. These include UMLSec [4], abuse cases [5],
misuse cases [6] and the SQUARE method [7]. Many
approaches and methods are however threat specific,
reactive and subjective [8].
Anti-malware applications are dependent on the de-
tection of what is known i.e. specific threats. In essence
this is accomplished by the identification of a piece of
malware’s signature, actions, heuristics or a combination
of these [9]. Intrusion detection systems, stateful inspec-
tion and packet analyzing firewalls investigate incoming
and outgoing packets (e.g. TCP and IP) for violations
against rules contained within their configuration files.
Again these rules are based on specific threats. Examples
include various forms of hijacking and port scanning,
SYN flooding and amplification attacks. When infil-
trated, knowledge specific to the attack is built to prevent
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it in the future.
On the other hand, approaches that are used to incor-
porate security during the early stages of software devel-
opment attempt to determine potential threats. The tasks
associated with the identification of potential security
threats are to select the assets to be protected, identify
vulnerabilities in the context of potential threats and
specify countermeasures [10]. The associated methods
are however, highly subjective. For example, the guide-
lines for the incorporation of misuse cases during the
engineering process involves the introduction of “threats
that are reasonably likely” to a set of use cases. UMLsec
models attackers by representing possible capabilities
(e.g. the default attacker described as one with “modest
capability”). The SQUARE method suggests the use of
misuse cases, abuse cases and threat scenarios among
others to elicit security requirements.
Interestingly, the source of many an attack can be
traced to stages of development as early as the require-
ments engineering phase. The Common Weakness Enu-
meration listed the top twenty-five sources of software
vulnerabilities [11]. The number one source was the
improper validation of inputs, a function that can be
designed into a system as early as the requirements engi-
neering phase of development. Attacks such as cross-site
scripting, SQL and command injection take advantage
of improper input validation. To extend coetaneous ap-
proaches and methods to securing software systems we
determined that a more proactive, objective approach is
needed.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In section
two we introduce and discuss the concepts of path
fixation and loopholes, in section three we describe the
methods involved in the approach, section four presents
the Secure Requirements Writer (SECREt) and demon-
strates the effectiveness of the loophole analysis. We
conclude and discuss our future work in section five.
II. PATH FIXATION AND LOOPHOLES
Functional fixation is the inability to see uses for
something beyond the use commonly presented for it
[12], in other words, it is the belief that something can
only be used for its default or intended purpose. We
transpose the notion of functional fixation to the analysis
of requirements, by considering possibilities for using
a system being designed in ways other than those that
are intended. To investigate such possibilities we analyse
paths.
We define paths to be the sequences of desired system
or application functions and their pre- and post condi-
tions, as they are defined in a software requirements
specification (SRS) document. Analogously then, we
define path fixation as the belief that the paths described
in an SRS are the only ones that will exist in the
proposed system. The discovery of paths that contradict
such beliefs is the basis of our loophole analysis.
Loopholes are potential paths that will result in a user
or system capability that contradicts a user or system
constraint, as specified in the requirements document.
We will demonstrate, using the SECREt, that loopholes
can lead to potential security flaws in a system or
application.
III. THE METHODS OF THE APPROACH
The fundamental aspect of our approach is that it is
based on a security policy. A security policy is the spec-
ification of the allowed interactions of a system’s users
and objects [8]. For the purpose of the approach we must
also select an appropriate definition of a vulnerability,
one that is also based on a security policy. Piessens
defines a vulnerability as any aspect of a computer
system that allows for breaches in its security policy
[13]. A loophole (see definition in section II above) is
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therefore a vulnerability. We adopt Piessens’ definition,
as our concept of a loophole coincides with his notion
of a vulnerability. The steps involved in our loophole
analysis are summarised below:
1) Convert the SRS into a more concise format.
2) Develop a more complete specification document,
with respect to security.
3) Discover potential vulnerabilities by analysing the
amended specification document for loopholes.
4) Improve the security of the intended system by
rectifying any discovered loopholes.
A. Derived Requirements
To convert an SRS into a more concise format we
employ the use of derived requirements. A derived
requirement (DR) is a policy-based expression: it de-
scribes the action a subject performs on an object as
either a capability or a constraint [8]. For example, the
requirement,
2.1.5 The accountant shall be able to read the expenses
file
would be expressed in the derived requirement format
as,
2.1.5[user accountant : access read : file expenses ]cap
where the subject is the ’useraccountant’, the action
is ’accessread’ and the object is ’fileexpenses’. In the
derived requirement format, accountant, read and ex-
penses are called clarifiers. These clarifiers and the other
variables subject, action and object are the elements of a
derived requirement expression. By representing an SRS
as a set of derived requirements we are able to reduce
its size, on average, by over 90%, and still maintain
the essence of the description of the intended system
functionality.
B. Imposed Security Dependence
To appropriately analyse the specification document
for loopholes, based on the description of the functions
of a system contained in a specification document, the
document itself must be suitably complete. In particular,
it must be suitably completed with respect to its security
requirements, as these are usually major cross-cutting
concerns in the development of a system. The primary
issue however, with incorporating aspects related to the
security of a system during the requirements engineer-
ing process is that these aspects are typically included
implicitly [14]. We address this by defining the imposed
security dependency.
Elements of derived requirements such as actions and
objects may have imposed security dependencies [15].
We define an imposed security dependence as follows:
Boilerplate placement value (BPV) α has an imposed
security dependence (ISD) on BPV β when the use of α
in a derived requirement dictates the use of β in at least
one related derived requirement.
Boilerplates are templates that are used to express
requirements in a consistent manner [16]. We incorporate
boilerplates in developing derived requirement expres-
sions. The placement values are the items of data used to
complete the requirement template and are then extracted
into a derived requirement. ISD relationships are neither
reflexive nor symmetrical but can be transitive. To reduce
possible ambiguity of meaning and due to the implicit
nature of security requirements, placement values can
be standardized in an ISD table that defines them, their
attributes and their imposed security dependencies.
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C. The Loophole Algorithm
Having converted a specification document into a
more concise form using derived requirements, and
developed a more complete set of requirements using
the derived format and imposed security dependencies,
we can now begin the analysis for loopholes.
Let D be the set of all derived requirements that
are obtained from a particular requirements document,
and R be a relation that maps an element of D to
its successor element(s). A requirement’s successors are
those requirements (0..n) that describe the functions or
processes that shall be available or reachable directly
from it. Successors are obtained from the post conditions
of each requirement in a specification document. As we
wish to represent the possible transitions from function
to function within the proposed system, the properties of
R are listed below.
R : D ↔ D (1)
∀r : D • r 7→ r /∈ R (2)
∀r, q : D • r 7→ q ∈ R⇒ q 7→ r ∈ R (3)
∀r, q, s : D • r 7→ q ∈ R ∧ q 7→ s ∈ R⇒ r 7→ s ∈ R
(4)
Using these properties of R, a hierarchy of derived
requirements and their successors is created, and this
hierarchy is then used to construct the mappings of
R. The hierarchy is depicted as a simple digraph. The
requirement references (nodes) and directed edges are
used to represent the relationships among requirements
and their successors. By utilizing R we want to iden-
tify policy breaches. The policy is described by the
allowed interactions of the intended system’s users and
objects i.e. the members of D. To identify breaches,
we analyse the potential transitions (paths) by analysing
the mappings contained in R. For this purpose R is
incomplete as the intended transitions from process to
process have been defined in the requirements document,
but intrinsically these are not all that are possible. We
therefore complete the “description” of the set of all
possible paths by finding the transitive closure of R. The
steps of the loophole analysis are as follows:
1) Represent the relation R as a binary matrix M.
2) Find the transitive closure of R, using the Floyd-
Warshall algorithm. Call this new relation R*.
3) Represent R* as a binary matrix M′.
4) Perform the bit-wise XOR of corresponding ele-
ments of M and M′. This will identify maplets
created as a result of step 2.
5) Where a 1 exists in M′ but not M, excluding
any that exist along its diagonal (as we are not
interested in reflexivity by statement 2), create a
temporary derived requirement by combining the
subject of the head derived requirement of the
path (head endpoint) with the action and object of
the tail derived requirement (tail endpoint) of the
path. In a two dimensional matrix representation
of M′ the head endpoint will correspond to a row
identifier and the tail endpoint a column identifier.
6) Compare each temporary derived requirement with
every derived requirement in D expressed as a
constraint.
7) A loophole (i.e. a vulnerability) exists when there
is a match.
IV. LOOPHOLE ANALYSIS WITH THE SECRET
The SECREt is a proof-of-concept prototype written
in Javascript, HTML and SQLite. It was designed to
be used by a requirements engineer to augment existing
approaches to developing requirements for more secure
software systems. It is to be incorporated at the end of the
requirements engineering phase: having created a set of
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requirements using traditional methods of elicitation and
incorporating methods such as misuse cases and attack
trees, the engineer would then use the SECREt to further
“harden” the intended system by identifying omissions
and inconsistencies among requirements, creating a more
suitably complete set of requirements with respect to
security, and searching for and addressing any loopholes.
Its main features include the ability to:
• format derived requirements.
• identify security related deficiencies in requirements
(first stage analysis or 1SA). These deficiencies are
oversights, omissions, weak authentication (pass-
words and phrases) and potential disclosures.
• generate derived requirements based on imposed
security dependencies using an ISD table (second
stage analysis or 2SA). As discussed earlier, we
are striving for completeness with respect to the
security aspects of the requirements specification.
• identify policy breaches using the algorithm previ-
ously discussed (third stage analysis or 3SA).
• generate a skeletal requirements document using
a derived requirement set, the Volere requirements
shell [17] and boilerplates [16].
Sets of DRs can also be saved to or loaded from a file,
printed and sorted. ISD tables are also managed using
the SECREt. The 1SA is described in [8]. The 2SA is
governed by the function analyzeISD(). This function
identifies omitted security related requirements based on
an ISD table stored in one of the tool’s SQLite databases.
It incorporates the use of four sub-functions that each
loop through the set of derived requirements and check
for omissions related to actions, objects, action and
object clarifiers. The 2SA successfully completes when
no new derived requirements have been added to the
set. The function findLoopHoles() governs the 3SA by
executing the following processes:
a) sorts the set D by object.
b) verifies that all successor requirement entries
are valid. A successor is deemed invalid if a
corresponding derived requirement does not
exist. findLoopHoles() cannot continue until
all successor requirement entries have been
validated.
c) builds the binary, n x n matrix M (where
n=|D|) using multi-dimensional arrays, and
makes a copy of M. This copy is used to
complete the transitive closure of M, M′.
d) performs the Floyd-Warshall algorithm to
complete the transitive closure of R.
findLoopHoles() then compares the arrays used to rep-
resent M and M′. If there is no difference between
the two, the function raises an alert that indicates no
loopholes were discovered. If there is a difference then
the bit-wise XOR is performed on the arrays, temporary
derived requirements are built, and the function then
loops through an array of derived requirements expressed
as constraints. The function then compares the temporary
derived requirements with these constraints and displays
any matches that are found as potential flaws. These
matches correspond to loopholes or vulnerabilitites that
exist in the system’s design.
Fig. 1 displays a screen capture of the results of a 3SA
on an actual specification document [18]. In the results
pane we see that the SECREt has identified flaws. It
indicates that an ordinary user can execute a process that
allows him/her to become the application’s administrator
and perform such tasks as creating user accounts. How-
ever, the specification document prohibits an ordinary
user from carrying out such tasks as R.4.2.1.2, (see fig. 1)
is expressed as a constraint. This is a violation of policy
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and therefore a vulnerability. Our multi-stage loophole
analysis, embodied in the SECREt, is summarised in Fig.
2.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have demonstrated that the SECREt can identify
potential vulnerabilities in systems based on a system’s
requirements specification document. The identification
is based on the discovery of loopholes. These are un-
known paths that would exist if the system were to be
developed in accordance with the specification document
in the form prior to the loophole analysis. Further,
the analysis did not include nor require the motives,
resources and skills of an attacker or possible threats to
the system to be postulated. Its foundation is based on the
statement of policy, expressed as a derived requirement.
We conclude that the loophole analysis is an objective
approach to the identification of potential vulnerabilities
in systems.
We are pursuing a number of enhancements to the
SECREt. It is to be re-written in a stricter language
and a less ’volatile’ environment since keeping abreast
with changes in browser functionality has been an un-
necessary development requirement for the tool. Once re-
written we intend to improve the interface and features of
the tool and make it freely available via the Internet. Fea-
ture enhancements include the ability to automatically
transform a requirements document from formats such as
the Volere requirements shell or the IEEE 830 standard,
into that of the derived requirement. The tool will also
provide the ability to step through loopholes to visualize
the points along the paths that raise concerns. This will
provide an engineer the ability to develop appropriate
countermeasures with minimal effect on the intended
system’s features.
Perhaps the most important feature to be included will
be the SECREt’s security assurance rating of proposed
systems. This rating will assert that the requirements
engineers of a proposed system have satisfactorily con-
sidered and addressed particular classes of vulnerabilities
during the design process. The rating, however, will
only be applicable if the system is developed in strict
accordance with the specification, after the SECREt’s
analyses and modifications have been performed and
made to the specification.
The SECREt, although tested using small to medium
sized documents, has not been tested with documents
that detail large and very large systems. This is primarily
due to the unavailability of such documents for our re-
search due to the reluctance of organizations to disclose
such information.
Finally, our research has raised a few questions that
are primarily statistical in nature. Do loopholes exist in
every specification document? What is the average num-
ber of loopholes that can be expected in documents that
specify small, medium, large and very large systems? Is
the number of loopholes that are discovered proportional
to the size of the intended system? How can the process
of requirements engineering be improved to reduce the
number of loopholes that are introduced? The SECREt
will be utilized to investigate the answers.
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